Articles

6 October 2017

Public Consultation on "SIArb Guidelines of Party Representative Ethics"

The parameters of ethical conduct in international arbitration are not well-defined but warrant close attention. The Singapore Institute of Arbitrators (“SIArb”) Working Group on Party-Representative Ethics (“Working Group”) has completed its first draft of the SIArb Guidelines on Party-Representative Ethics (“Guidelines”).

SIArb is pleased to announce the commencement of the public consultation process.

View/Download Consultation paper HERE.

View/Download the draft Guidelines HERE.

SIArb members and all interested practitioners are invited to review the draft Guidelines and send in their comments during the consultation period (which ends on 15 November 2017). Comments may be sent to This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.or in hard copy to Singapore Institute of Arbitrators, 6 Eu Tong Sen Street, #05-07, Singapore 059817, FAO Working Group on Party-Representative Ethics.

You are also invited to join us for Gary Born’s upcoming seminar “Ethical Issues for Arbitrators and Party-Representatives” on 10 October 2017 where these issues and the draft guidelines will be discussed.

By Sean Hardy - Senior Associate, Pinsent Masons MPillay & Raman Kaur - Associate, MPillay

In the recent case of BC Andaman v Xie Ning [2017] SGHC 64 the Singapore High Court confirmed its power to grant permanent anti-suit injunctions to restrain foreign court proceedings brought in breach of arbitration agreements governed by Singapore law. 

The Singapore Courts' application of anti-suit injunctions in this context is a relatively recent development but is now well-established.

Taking steps to stop (or prevent) the breach of arbitration agreements is of course consistent with both the Singapore Courts’ well established reputation for giving primacy to and upholding arbitration agreements, and Singapore's reputation as an international arbitration hub.

Some commentators, however, have suggested that while it is clear the Singapore Courts have the power to issue interim anti-suit injunctions in this context, they may not have the power to issue permanent anti-suit injunctions. Others continue to question the legitimacy of anti-suit injunctions which restrain foreign court proceedings more generally.

This month we examine in light of BC Andaman v Xie Ning anti-suit injunctions under Singapore law where there is an arbitration agreement, the sources of the Singapore Court's power to grant them, and some of the arguments against their application.

The basics

A valid arbitration agreement imposes a contractual obligation on the parties – in respect of matters governed by the agreement – to arbitrate disputes and, in turn, to refrain from commencing proceedings in any other forum.

When a party breaches that agreement by commencing foreign court proceedings, a Court (or Tribunal) may grant an anti-suit injunction to prevent the party from commencing or continuing those proceedings. An interim injunction, usually sought where there is great urgency, is of course temporary and subject to final determination by the Court or Tribunal. A permanent injunction is final.

An anti-suit injunction in this context (interim or permanent) does not restrain the foreign Court from hearing the proceedings. Rather, it restrains the party pursuing the foreign court proceedings from doing so, or continuing to do so.

Test

BC Andaman confirms that the test applied to the granting of anti-suit injunctions (interim or permanent) differs from the test applicable to interim injunctions generally (typically the test laid down in American Cyanmid Co v Ethicon [1975] A.C. 396).

The Court will consider various factors, including the breach of the arbitration or other jurisdiction agreement, which is the more appropriate forum, whether the foreign court proceedings are vexatious or oppressive, and whether any injustice would be suffered by the party bringing the foreign court proceedings by depriving it of legitimate judicial advantages in doing so.

However, the Singapore Courts will generally grant an anti-suit injunction to restrain a party from pursuing foreign court proceedings where it can be established that doing so is in breach of a valid arbitration agreement. In Maldives Airport v GMR Male International Airport the Singapore Court of Appeal followed the approach of the English Court of Appeal in Angelic Grace [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep that an injunction to restrain foreign Court proceedings is justified “on the clear and simple ground that the defendant has promised not to bring them" (Maldives Airport, at [42]).

Source of power

The Singapore High Court first granted an interim anti-suit injunction to prevent the breach of an arbitration agreement in 2002 (WSG Nimbus Pte Ltd v Board of Control of Cricket in Sri Lanka [2002] 1 SLR(R) 1088).

However, it was not until 2013 that the Singapore Courts considered the granting of a permanent anti-suit injunction in this context (Maldives Airport).

The Court of Appeal gave a clear nod to the practice. Menon CJ noted, obiter, at [42] that the right to resolve disputes pursuant to an arbitration agreement could “rightfully be protected by way of an anti-suit injunction, whether on a final or an interim basis”.

Finally, in 2015 in R1 International Pte Ltd v Lonstroff AG [2015] 1 SLR 521 the Singapore Court of Appeal granted a permanent anti-suit injunction, restraining Swiss court proceedings on the basis that that parties had an agreement to arbitrate in Singapore.

The existence and source of the court’s power to grant a permanent anti-suit injunction was not addressed in the judgment by the Court of Appeal in R1 International. However, these issues had been considered, obiter, in the decision at first instance ([2014] SGHC 69).

In the High Court below, Prakash J (as she then was) noted that the court has the power to grant a permanent anti-suit injunction to prevent a breach of an arbitration agreement and that this power emanated from section 4(10) of the Civil Law Act. She also noted that clear words would be needed to abrogate this general power and that the International Arbitration Act does not contain such language.

In BC Andaman Loh J noted the "well-established" principles governing the granting of permanent anti-suit injunctions and their statutory recognition. He cited s 4(10) of the Civil Law Act, as Prakash J had done, but also relied on the Court's inherent jurisdiction as per paragraph 14 to the First Schedule of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act:

14. [The High Court has the] Power to grant all reliefs and remedies at law and in equity, including, damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific performance."

This is a helpful clarification as reliance on section 4(10) of Civil Law Act alone is potentially problematic given it appears on its face to be limited to the court's power to grant interim (or interlocutory) rather than permanent injunctions.

Arguments against

International Arbitration Act

The Singapore Courts have previously recognised the International Arbitration Act as expressly granting it the power to grant interim anti-suit injunctions (section 12A, read with section 12(1)(i) of the IAA), but not permanent anti-suit injunctions (for example, R1 International Pte Ltd v Lonstroff AG [2014] SGHC 69).

 In turn, it has been suggested that Article 5 of the Model Law (which has the force of law pursuant to section 3(1) of the International Arbitration Act) precludes the Courts from granting permanent anti-suit injunctions, given the absence of an express power to do so (unlike interim anti-suit injunctions). Article 5 provides that:

"In matters governed by this Law, no court shall intervene except where so provided in this Law."

However, as above, the Singapore Courts have identified a different legislative source of their power to grant permanent anti-suit injunctions, which does not rely on the International Arbitration Act.

Further, this objection assumes that the Model Law exhaustively governs all matters relating to the enforcement of arbitration agreements, and that this must therefore include permanent anti-suit injunctions. However, the travaux prepartoires of the Model Law suggests that this is not the case, indicating that the Model Law does not govern all enforcement-related matters, including for example the impact of State immunity and parties' capacity to conclude an arbitration agreement

Kompentenz-Kompentenz

A further objection to the Court's power to grant permanent anti-suit injunctions has been proposed in the specific scenario where the injunction is sought before a tribunal decides on its jurisdiction, thus offending the kompetenz-kompetenz principle that the tribunal must have jurisdiction to do so.

However, this is academic because, if the anti-suit injunction is granted, the tribunal would still have the opportunity then to rule on its jurisdiction.

On the other hand, if the anti-suit injunction was not granted in these circumstances and the foreign court accepted jurisdiction, this would arguably represent a far more serious breach of the kompetenz-kompetenz principle given the foreign court would effectively be deciding that the arbitration agreement does not apply and the arbitral tribunal should not have jurisdiction.

New York Convention

A related argument is that in accordance with Article II of the NY Convention, which obliges courts of signatory countries to stay court proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement, any foreign court of a signatory country should first be given the opportunity to stay those court proceedings. In turn, if an anti-suit injunction deprives the foreign court of this opportunity, it offends the NY Convention.

However, as noted by the High Court in WSG Nimbus, the NY Convention "obliges state parties to uphold arbitration agreements and awards". Anti-suit injunctions to restrain foreign court proceedings commenced in breach of arbitration agreements are, in principle, entirely consistent with this objective.

Further, the practical reality is that not all signatories fully honour their obligations under the NY Convention.

The alternative – if an anti-suit injunction is not granted on this basis and the foreign court accepts jurisdiction but does not then stay the court proceedings – would arguably represent a far more serious breach of the NY Convention.

International Comity

Finally, arguments to resist anti-suit injunctions (both interim and permanent) on grounds of international comity are probably as old as the remedy itself.

However, it is well established under English law, and there has been no departure from this under Singapore law, that any affront to comity is minimal where an anti-suit injunction is sought to enforce a party's contractual agreement to arbitrate. As noted in Angelic Grace, which was approved by the Singapore Court of Appeal in Maldives Airport at [42]:

“…I cannot accept the proposition that any Court would be offended by the grant of an injunction to restrain a party from invoking a jurisdiction which he had promised not to invoke and which it was its own duty to decline.”

Conclusion

It is clear that the Singapore Courts are prepared to take action against parties who breach valid arbitration agreements by commencing foreign court proceedings.

While BC Andaman is unlikely to silence all detractors, it helpfully provides further confirmation and clarity regarding the Singapore Court's position that it has the power to grant both interim and permanent anti-suit injunctions to restrain foreign court proceedings brought in breach of arbitration agreements, and the source of that power.

The Singapore legislation, NY Convention and legal doctrines considered above do leave some, limited room for arguments that the Singapore Courts do not have the power to grant anti-suit injunctions – particularly permanent anti-suit injunctions.

However, these arguments, although no doubt of interest to legal commentators, are unlikely to be of any practical application before the Singapore Courts when considered in the full context of the Singapore legislation and the NY Convention.

By DEBBIE LEE - Associate, ECYT Law LLC

Introduction

1. Champerty and maintenance are age-old doctrines that have been long established in common law. As the Senior Minister of State for Law Ms. Indranee Rajah, has concisely explained: “Maintenance is the provision of assistance to a party by a person or entity that has no interest in the proceedings. Champerty is maintenance of an action in return for a share in the proceeds of the action.”¹

2. Champerty and maintenance were prohibited in common law jurisdictions to prevent abuses of the legal system by those who were financially empowered to launch strategic legal attacks for the purpose of gaining profit. Third-party funding has thus been prohibited due to the laws against champerty and maintenance, which essentially rendered contracts for third-party funding illegal and unenforceable.

3. There has been a paradigm shift in the laws against champerty and maintenance that started in Australia, followed by the UK and Europe, then Canada and the United States. Third-party litigation and arbitration funding is now permitted in these jurisdictions.

4. Closer to home, Hong Kong has recently come on board as an advocate of third-party funding for international arbitration.²

5. Singapore has since followed suit. On 7 November 2016, the Ministry of Law proposed amendments to the law to permit third-party funding for international arbitrations seated in Singapore, related court proceedings and mediation. The Civil Law (Amendment) Bill was passed on 10 January 2017.

The Civil Law (Amendment) Bill

6. The Civil Law (Amendment) Bill³ amends the Civil Law Act (Cap. 43) (the “CLA”) to formally abolish the common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance and clarify that third-party funding contracts for international arbitration seated in Singapore, related court proceedings and mediation, are not contrary to public policy or illegal.

7. Subsidiary legislation sets out the requirements and qualifications that third-party funders must meet to enter into a third-party funding contract.

8. The amendments to the CLA have led to corresponding amendments to the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161). Lawyers will be able to:

                 a. Recommend third-party funders to their clients; and

                 b. Advise their clients on third-party funding contracts,

as long as they do not receive any direct financial benefit from their recommendation or advice – this excludes legal fees paid for legal services to the funded party.

Why the Paradigm Shift?

9. The main motivation for the amendment of the Civil Law Act is so that Singapore can strengthen its position as the region’s cross-border dispute resolution hub.⁴

10. With third-party funding gaining momentum in the common law jurisdictions from which Singapore jurisprudence draws guidance and receives influence, it is inevitable that Singapore embraces these changes to keep her competitive edge.

How Will Third-Party Funding Change the Legal Landscape in Singapore?

11. The availability of third-party funding would help plaintiffs who cannot afford representation and empower the party that is out-resourced by its opponent. This could potentially improve the start-up industry and innovation in Singapore, with start-up companies more well-equipped to enforce their legal rights.

12. Further, with the funder’s resources, funded parties will be able to more efficiently assess their cases, which would allow better decisions to be made. In effect, funding will allow for better risk management in cases.

The Case Against Third-Party Funding

13. On the flip side, third-party funding arrangements may result in undisclosed conflicts of interest, for example, prior relationships between the funder and the law firm involved in the arbitration or the funder and the arbitrator.⁵

14. The other potential concern is that the funder may engage in frivolous lawsuits anyway and in dealing with the risks associated with the same, spread the risks of the unmeritorious claim among various investors by amassing a conglomerate of investors or securitization of the costs of litigation.⁶

15. Further, as the funder has an interest in the outcome of a dispute, there is a risk that it might seek to seize control of the proceedings from the party. This could include behaviour such as pressuring the party into settling or preventing the party from settling, even if it were against the best interests of the party, or the withdrawal of funding at the last minute.⁷

16. Lawyers are also faced with an additional challenge – to act in the best interests of the client, but receive funding from the third-party funder. The risk here is that third-party funders may exert pressure on lawyers to act in their interests, which may not necessarily be in their clients’ best interests.⁸

Myth Debunked?

17. The issue of unmeritorious claims has been one of the most debated topics in third-party funding. It was opined that funding arrangements are more likely to deter unmeritorious claims - third-party funders will conduct due diligence and have a vetting process, as it is not in their commercial interests to take on weak, unmeritorious cases.⁹ Third-party funders thus tend to avoid claims based on novel legal theories or theories that stand a substantial risk of being reversed on appeal.¹⁰

Concluding Thoughts

18. In an effort to keep herself relevant in cross-border dispute resolution, Singapore has taken a courageous but cautious step toward allowing, on a limited basis, third-party funding, where the Ministry of Law will “consult closely with the profession and stakeholders”.¹¹

19. The new legislation seems to be encouraging the culture of disclosure by making transparency the focus.¹² This would address the concern of potential conflicts of interest in third-party funding situations.

20. While dissidents may fear that the evils of third-party funding outweigh the benefits, it is imperative that the legal system in Singapore stay relevant against the backdrop of developments in the international commercial world. With the new legislation in place, it is ultimately up to the discretion of the international arbitration tribunals to be well aware of such concerns and to apply these new laws to maximize the benefits of third-party funding.

¹ Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Civil Law (Amendment) Bill (10 January 2017) vol 94 at 2.26 pm (Indranee Rajah, Senior Minister of State for Law).

² Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong, Third Party Funding for Arbitration Consultation Paper (October 2016) <http://www.hkreform.gov.hk>. 

³ Civil Law (Amendment) Bill (Bill No. 38/2016).

⁴ Supra n 1.

⁵ Victoria Shannon Sahani, “Judging Third-Party Funding” 63 UCLA L. Rev. 388 (2016)

⁶ U.S. Chamber (Institute for Legal Reform) website <http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/third-party-litigation-funding>

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Supra n 6.

⁹ Douglas R. Richmond, “Litigation Funding: Investing, Lending or Loan Sharking?” 2005 Prof. Law. Symp. Issues 17, at 27

¹⁰ Richard Lloyd, “The New, New Thing”, The American Lawyer (17 May 2010)

¹¹ Supra n 1, at 3.18 pm.

¹² Ibid.  

By MICHELLE LEE - Associate, Baker & McKenzie.Wong & Leow

The sixth and latest edition of the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre ("SIAC Rules 2016") came into effect on 1 August 2016. It is the product of an extensive public consultation process in multiple forums across Asia, Europe, and North America.¹  It takes into account recent developments in the international arbitration space and is aimed at meeting the needs of its users such as businesses, financial institutions and governments.²  The SIAC Rules 2016 introduce both groundbreaking innovations and enhancements to provide its users with greater time and cost efficiencies. This article covers the significant changes introduced in the SIAC Rules 2016.

  1. Early Dismissal of Claims and Defences (Rule 29)

The SIAC is the first of its kind to introduce a procedure for early dismissal of claims and defences. As in litigation practice, it is intended to offer parties an avenue to seek the dismissal of a claim or a defence that is manifestly without legal merit, or manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.³

The language adopted in this new rule suggests that it was derived from institutional rules for investor-state arbitrations, as it is similar to Rule 41(5) of the International Centre For Settlement Of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") Convention Arbitration Rules, which provides a party with a right to file an objection on the basis that a claim is "manifestly without legal merit". Evidently, the SIAC Rules 2016 go further, by allowing an early dismissal objection to also be brought against defenses, and allowing objections to also be brought on the basis of the Tribunal's manifest lack of jurisdiction.

If the application for early dismissal is allowed to proceed, the Tribunal has to make an order or award on the application, with reasons (which may be in summary form), within 60 days of the date of filing of the application, unless the Registrar of the Court of Arbitration of SIAC ("SIAC Court") ("Registrar") extends such time in exceptional circumstances.⁴

2. Consolidation (Rule 6 and 8)

The SIAC Rules 2016 introduce a streamlined procedure for the commencement of arbitration for disputes arising out of or in connection with multiple contracts and arbitration agreements. Under Rule 6, the claimant may choose one of the following procedures:

1. Normal procedure: file multiple Notices of Arbitration, one for each arbitration agreement, and concurrently submit an application for consolidation; or
2. Streamlined procedure: file a single Notice of Arbitration for all the relevant arbitration agreements, in which case the claimant would be deemed to have commenced multiple arbitrations, one for each arbitration agreement, and the Notice of Arbitration itself would be deemed to be an application for consolidation.

Gary Born (President of the SIAC Court) et al, who played a part in drafting the SIAC Rules 2016, explained that the streamlined procedure presents a key advantage for users because the deemed commencement of multiple arbitrations ensures that the rights of the parties are preserved in relation to limitation periods.⁵ This is because should an application for consolidation be rejected in whole or in part, a claimant would have to re-file a Notice of Arbitration in respect of the arbitrations that were not consolidated and such filing may subsequently be out of time.⁶

After the commencement of arbitration proceedings, a party may apply for consolidation either to the SIAC Court if the application is made prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, or the Tribunal itself if the application is made after the Tribunal has been constituted.

Where the application for consolidation is made prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, any one of the following criteria must be satisfied for consolidation by the SIAC Court:⁷

1. all parties have agreed to the consolidation;
2. all the claims in the arbitrations are made under the same arbitration agreement; or
3. the arbitration agreements are compatible, and:
   i.     the disputes arise out of the same legal relationship(s);
   ii.     the disputes arise out of contracts consisting of a principal contract and its ancillary contract(s); or
   iii. the disputes arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions.

The same criteria apply for consolidation by the Tribunal, with an additional requirement for criterion (b), i.e. that either the same Tribunal has been constituted in each of the arbitrations to be consolidated, or that no Tribunal has been constituted in the other arbitration(s).⁸

3.  Joinder (Rule 7)

Under the previous edition of the SIAC Rules, only existing parties to the arbitration could apply for the joinder of non-parties. The SIAC Rules 2016 now allow both parties and non-parties to apply for joinder and the application may be made either to the SIAC Court if the application is made prior to the constitution of the Tribunal, or the Tribunal itself if the application is made after the Tribunal has been constituted.

The criterion for joinder has also been expanded in the SIAC Rules 2016. Under the previous edition, the party to be joined must be a party to the arbitration agreement⁹,  whereas under the SIAC Rules 2016, the party to be joined only needs to be "prima facie bound by the arbitration agreement". ¹⁰ This clearly extends the availability of joinder but the SIAC Rules 2016 make it clear that any decision of the SIAC Court or the Tribunal to grant the joinder application would not prejudice the Tribunal's power to subsequently decide any question as to its jurisdiction arising from such decision.¹¹

Further, the SIAC Court's decision to reject an application for joinder would not prejudice any party's or non-party's right to subsequently apply to the Tribunal for joinder after it has been constituted.¹²

4. Procedural Enhancements - Increased Time and Cost Efficiencies

The SIAC Rules 2016 include procedural enhancements to the Emergency Arbitrator provisions and the Expedited Procedure. These procedural enhancements are expected to provide greater time and cost efficiencies to its users.

1. Emergency Arbitrator (Rule 30, Schedule 1 & Schedule of Fees)
   The President of the SIAC Court is now required under the SIAC Rules 2016 to seek to appoint an Emergency Arbitrator within one calendar day of receipt of the application for emergency interim relief ¹³,  as compared to one business day under the previous edition of the SIAC Rules ¹⁴.  The fact that most other major arbitral institutions currently provide for a 2-day timeframe shows that the SIAC is keen to provide its users with as much time savings as practicable. Having said that, it should be noted that the timeframe for challenges to the appointment of the Emergency Arbitrator has been extended from one business day to two calendar days.¹⁵
   
   Further, while the previous edition of the SIAC Rules was silent on the timeframe for the Emergency Arbitrator to issue its interim order or Award, the SIAC Rules 2016 now prescribe that the Emergency Arbitrator must make his or her interim order or Award within 14 days from the date of appointment, unless the Registrar extends the time under exceptional circumstances.¹⁶

   In order to provide its users with certainty on costs, the SIAC Rules 2016 now provide that the fees of the Emergency Arbitrator are fixed at S$25,000 regardless of the quantum of the claim, unless determined otherwise by the Registrar.

   As a side note, according to statistics from the SIAC, as of 21 October 2016, the SIAC received a total number of 51 applications for emergency interim relief for the period between 1 July 2010 and 21 October 2016. This is significant when compared to the experiences of other arbitral institutions such as the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center, which has only received 6 cases to-date. One of the main reasons for this disparity is that the SIAC Rules provide for the retrospective application of its Emergency Arbitrator provisions to arbitration agreements entered into before those provisions were implemented, whereas other arbitral institutional rules require the arbitration agreement to have been entered into after the emergency arbitrator provisions were included in those rules.¹⁷
   
   

2. Expedited Procedure (Rule 5)
   

   The Expedited Procedure provides time and cost-savings to parties with relatively smaller disputes. In order to allow more parties to benefit from this, the SIAC Rules 2016 raised the monetary threshold from S$5M to S$6M.

   Further, possibly in response to the challenge brought before the Singapore High Court in AQZ v ARA [2015] SLR 972, where the award debtor challenged an SIAC award on the ground that the parties had expressly agreed to arbitration before three arbitrators, and that therefore the conduct of the expedited arbitration before a sole arbitrator was not in accordance with the parties' agreement¹⁸,  the SIAC Rules 2016 now make it unequivocally clear that in the event of any conflict between the terms of the arbitration agreement and the provisions under the Expedited Procedure, the latter would apply.¹⁹

These groundbreaking innovations and procedural enhancements in the SIAC Rules 2016 are expected to not only provide users with greater savings in time and costs, but also provide greater certainty and user-friendly mechanisms to the arbitral process. It would not be surprising to see other arbitral institutions looking to these new Rules and enhancing the competition amongst the institutions.

¹ SIAC, Public Consultation on Draft SIAC Arbitration Rules, 18 January 2016,
http://www.siac.org.sg/images/stories/press_release/Public%20consultation%20on%20draft%20SIAC%20Arbitration%20Rules_18%20January%202016.pdf;
SIAC, SIAC Announces the Official Release of the SIAC Rules 2016, 30 June 2016,
http://www.siac.org.sg/images/stories/press_release/SIAC%20Announces%20the%20Official%20Release%20of%20the%20SIAC%20Rules%20%202016_30June2016.pdf
² SIAC, Public Consultation on Draft SIAC Arbitration Rules, 18 January 2016,
http://www.siac.org.sg/images/stories/press_release/Public%20consultation%20on%20draft%20SIAC%20Arbitration%20Rules_18%20January%202016.pdf
³ SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 29.1.
⁴ SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 29.4.
⁵ Gary Born et al, 2016 SIAC Rules, 29 July 2016.
⁶ Gary Born et al, 2016 SIAC Rules, 29 July 2016.
⁷ SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 8.1.
⁸ SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 8.7(b).
⁹ SIAC Rules 2013, Rule 24.1(b).
¹⁰ SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 7.1.
¹¹ SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 7.4, 7.10.
¹² SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 7.4.
¹³ SIAC Rules 2016, Schedule 1, para 3.
¹⁴ SIAC Rules 2013, Schedule 1, para 2.
¹⁵ SIAC Rules 2013, Schedule 1, para 3; SIAC Rules 2016, Schedule 1, para 5.
¹⁶ SIAC Rules 2016, Schedule 1, para 9.
¹⁷ Michael Dunmore, The Use of Emergency Arbitration Provisions, 10 September 2015, <http://globalarbitrationnews.com/use-emergency-arbitration-provisions/>.
 ¹⁸ AQZ v ARA [2015] SLR 972 at [132], where the court ultimately rejected the award debtor's argument and held that a commercially sensible approach to interpreting the parties' arbitration agreement would be to recognize that the President of the SIAC Court does have the discretion to appoint a sole arbitrator pursuant to the SIAC Rules.
¹⁹ SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 5.3.