By Mahesh Rai, Drew & Napier LLC
Nature of Matter |
Setting aside of Arbitral Award / Challenging of enforcement of Arbitral Award |
Case Summary |
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Ruling |
The SGHC rejected Bloomberry’s application to set aside and/or resist enforcement of the Final Award, for the following reasons: The SGHC rejected Bloomberry’s framing of its argument that the Constructive Remedy fell outside the scope of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, and instead found that Bloomberry’s case (even at its highest) had to do with the erroneous exercise by the Tribunal of an available power (i.e. constituting a mere error of law / fact) as opposed to the Tribunal’s exercise of a power that it did not possess: at [43]. Additionally, the SGCA found that the Constructive Remedy did not bind or impose an obligation on a non-party to the Arbitration (i.e. PMHI), neither did it affect PMHI’s rights or interests. Rather, it merely awarded GGAM damages for which Bloomberry is liable: at [44]. The SGHC instead accepted GGAM’s submission that the claim for wrongful interference fell within the arbitration agreement in Clause 19.1 of the MSA: at [47] and [51]. The SGHC also appeared to agree with GGAM’s submission that in any event, Bloomberry had positively submitted to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction over the wrongful interference claim when Bloomberry applied to the RTC informing that the issue concerning the Shares would be decided by the Tribunal: at [52]. The SGHC rejected Bloomberry’s argument that by granting the Constructive Remedy, the Tribunal has enforced its own orders, thereby depriving PMHI / Bloomberry of its passive remedy to challenge enforcement of an award. The basis for the SGHC’s decision was that (i) the Constructive Remedy has not yet taken effect and it remains open for Bloomberry to challenge the first part of the Constructive Remedy, (ii) the purpose of the Constructive Remedy has little to do with aiding the Tribunal to enforce its own orders, which is a causation argument rather than a jurisdictional challenge, and (ii) the Tribunal was entitled to treat its Interim Measures Order dated 9 December 2014 as binding on the parties in the Arbitration: at [54] to [57]. The SGHC also rejected Bloomberry’s argument that the Constructive Remedy was punitive and thus transgressed the arbitration agreement in Clause 19.2(c) of the MSA. The SGHC instead found that the language of the Final Award indicates that the Constructive Remedy was fashioned with a compensatory objective in mind, notwithstanding any language critical of GGAM’s conduct: at [63] to [64]. Any errors by the Tribunal on its choice of valuation date and percentage discount was at best an error of fact going to the merits, which the court will not interfere with: at [65]. The SGHC rejected Bloomberry’s arguments that the Final Award should be set aside / refused enforcement because of an alleged breach of natural justice, Bloomberry’s inability to present its case, and/or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties. First, the SGHC found that Tribunal had rightly denied Bloomberry’s Request for Reconsideration of the Partial Award as it did not have the power to revisit / reopen the issue of liability under Singapore law, and the Tribunal was thus right to reject matters that would effectively cause it to revisit / reconsider the issue of liability in the Partial Award: at [75]. Second, the SGHC was satisfied on the facts that the Tribunal did consider (a) the FCPA Findings for the purpose of assessing damages, and (b) Bloomberry’s submission that GGAM’s damages ought to be reduced to nil given the multiple breaches of the MSA and the existence of the FCPA Findings: at [76] to [78]. It is the Tribunal’s prerogative to determine the relevance of evidence, and any mistakes in the Tribunal’s factual findings are not to be revisited by the court: at [79]. Third, SGHC rejected Bloomberry’s argument that the Tribunal’s failure to address concealments in document production concomitantly resulted in an arbitral procedural that deviated from the arbitration agreement. The SGHC gave two reasons for doing so: first, the SGHC was not satisfied that GGAM had actually concealed documents in violation of the Tribunal’s orders. Second, the Tribunal had evaluated the FCPA Findings and concluded that there was an evidential gap between any concealment of documents and the termination of the MSA. Only significant (and not minor) departures from the parties’ agreed arbitral procedure are captured by Art 34(2)(a)(iv) of the Model law, and there was no evidence to suggest that the alleged departure from the Tribunal’s procedure (if any) was material to the Tribunal’s final determination: at [81]. The SGHC rejected Bloomberry’s claim that the grant of damages to GGAM Netherlands was contrary to the public policy of Singapore: at [90]. The public policy ground of resisting enforcement / setting aside an award was a narrow ground that requires an outcome which would “shock the conscience”, or be contrary to “the forum’s most basic notion of morality and justice”: at [84]. The SGHC noted that the Tribunal had already dismissed Bloomberry’s ‘sham entity argument’ at paragraphs 178 to 180 of the Final Award, where Bloomberry argued that damages should not be awarded to GGAM Netherlands because the latter is a sham entity incapable of complying with the MSA’s obligations or performing the Post-Opening Services: at [85] – [86]. The SGHC agreed with GGAM’s submissions that the Tribunal’s findings of fact are binding on Bloomberry and cannot be reopened by the court: at [87]. |